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Abstract:
Although the linguistic theory of  Ferdinand de Saussure is widely 
recognised as the forerunner of  structuralism, it is often treated in the 
humanities and social sciences today as a stepping stone toward more 
sophisticated, generalised semiotics and theories of  discourse. As a result, 
social and political implications of  Saussure’s original conception of  
language have frequently been underestimated. Drawing from the classic 
lecture Course in General Linguistics and the fragmented notes collected 
in Writings in General Linguistics, this article offers a reconstruction 
of  the social and political dimensions that were present, albeit in an 
inchoate form, within Saussure’s own theorisation. To act as a foil to the 
reconstructed Saussurean position, this article calls upon an essay that 
charts the historical development of  the concept of  discourse authored 
by Ernesto Laclau, who is perhaps the most politically oriented thinker 
among the many inheritors of  the Saussurean legacy. 
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In a short essay that traces the historical development of  the concept 
of  discourse, Ernesto Laclau offers the following assessment apropos the 
limitations of  Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic theory:
In a Saussurean perspective, a linguistics of  discourse is impossible 
because a succession of  sentences is only governed by the whims of  
the speaker and does not present any structural regularity graspable by 
a general theory. With this Cartesian assertion of  the omnipotence of  
the subject, the very possibility of  linguistic theory of  discourse was 
ruled out.2
Exemplified by Laclau’s assessment is a common tendency in the 
humanities and social sciences that, whilst recognizing Saussure—
who himself  rarely spoke of  ‘structures’—as the founder of  structural 
linguistics and the forerunner of  structuralist thought, treats his thought 
as little more than a stepping stone toward more recent, sophisticated, and 
generalized semiotics and theories of  discourse associated with names such 
as Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, and, of  
course, Laclau himself. The heavy emphasis placed on post-Saussurean 
developments inevitably tends to downplay the distinctive understanding 
of  language as intertwined with the social and the political that can be 
glimpsed in Saussure’s own presentation of  his linguistic theory.3 
The attribution of  ‘Cartesian omnipotence’ to the Saussurean subject 
in Laclau’s assessment is apparently founded on a summary judgment 
that the Saussurean subject is incompatible with the ‘dislocated’ subject 
announced by a poststructuralist approach such as Laclau’s own—namely, 
the subject whose utterances are conditioned by the structure—that 
allows for the reimagination of  socially transformative political processes 
as material practices that reshape the social conditions of  subjectivity, 
hence the identity of  the subject, in ways that are supposedly unthinkable 
within Saussurean theory. Claiming thus that the Saussurean subject is in 
principle able to utter anything in language it wishes whenever it so wishes, 
Laclau suggests the specific content of  its utterances as determined by 
irregular and unpredictable ‘whims’. However, although it is true that 
Saussure sometimes imputes an ‘unlimited freedom’ to the speaker 
in the ‘articulation’ of  syntagms or sentences,4 a closer examination 
problematizes the characterization of  the speech of  the Saussurean 
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subject as ‘governed’ solely by its whims. While the innovations in 
structural linguistics (Roman Jakobson and Louis Hjelmslev counting 
amongst the most important contributors) that have been indispensable 
for a sophisticated theorization of  discourse must be acknowledged as 
such, Saussure’s original insights may be interpreted in a way that brings 
out a surprising degree of  continuity with the kind of  poststructuralist 
discourse theory that Laclau himself  has developed, to the extent that 
what he characterizes as Cartesian omnipotence and whims—connoting 
a sort of  unconditioned power to speak anything, whenever—could be 
shown to correspond to the margin of  freedom in thought that is not 
incompatible with the theoretical commitments of  Laclau’s own discourse 
theory.
Through a reconstruction of  a Saussurean position based on Saussure’s 
lectures and the edited volume of  his notes that answers to the issue 
raised by Laclau, it will be shown that the construction of  syntagms by 
a speaker can be apprehended in a way that allows the subject positions 
with which the speaker identifies herself  to be seen as influencing what 
can be said and what is said by the speaker. If, based on his theorization of  
discourse, Laclau proposes to understand politics as consisting in attempts 
to reconfigure the field of  the social by a plurality of  forces each striving 
to attain a hegemonic or universal status, then in Saussure’s vision of  
language, there is a ‘politics of  language’ that consists in heterogeneous 
language systems—langues—perpetually in interaction, effecting 
reconfigurations in the plurality of  langues that comprise what may come 
to be seen, and experienced, as one common language. That Saussure 
was a poststructuralist discourse theorist avant la lettre is a proposition that 
this paper has no intention of  defending. Nor will this paper advance 
the obverse proposition, suggested by Peter Caws, that the move toward 
poststructuralism and semiotics after Saussure was ‘regressive’.5 What this 
paper does hope to show, rather, is that there is an intersection of  language 
and politics in Saussure’s own thought, at which its proximity to Laclauian 
discourse theory and the politics of  hegemony Laclau has elucidated is 
clearly discernible.
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The Exposure of  Langues to Time and Alterity
Beginning with the common understanding that a sign is ‘conceived 
as a relation between an acoustic image (the signifier) and a concept (the 
signified)’, Laclau proceeds to summarize Saussure’s ‘basic principles 
around which structural linguistics is organized’ as follows: (1) in language, 
‘there are no positive terms, only differences’; (2) language is ‘form and not 
substance’, such that ‘each element of  the system is exclusively defined by 
the rules of  its combinations and substitutions with the other elements’. 
In the ‘entirely differential universe’ that Saussure had postulated, Laclau 
goes on to claim, ‘there is strict isomorphism: to each stream of  sounds 
constituting a word corresponds one and only one concept. The order of  
the signifier and the order of  the signified strictly overlap’.6 However, if  
there is no substance in language but only forms, and yet there is a strict 
isomorphism between the stratum of  the signifier and the stratum of  the 
signified, then the result can only be the collapse of  the duality of  the sign. 
This collapse, Laclau contends, is averted in the Saussurean text only by 
the ‘surreptitious’ introduction of  the substantial difference between the 
phonic and the conceptual. But if  this is the kind of  difference on which 
the duality of  the sign effectively stands, the fundamental principle that 
language concerns forms and not substances is already undermined in 
Saussure’s own conceptualization of  the sign. This, Laclau asserts, is the 
‘ultimately inconsistent’ nature of  the Saussurean sign. 
As a historical narrative of  the development of  the concept of  discourse 
would dictate, Laclau notes, accurately, that inheritors of  Saussure’s basic 
principles both within and beyond linguistics have insisted on the primacy 
of  the signifier, viewing the signified—or, as is perhaps more accurate by 
this point, signification—as the effect of  signifiers. Had the order of  signifiers 
not been liberated from the signified qua conceptual substance, the kind 
of  generalized semiotics that Saussure himself  envisioned would not have 
been possible. This poststructuralist commonplace, however, is not the 
fairest point of  departure for approaching Saussure’s thought. This is 
because the claim that there is a strict isomorphism between the differential 
relations at the stratum of  signifieds and at the stratum of  signifiers such 
that the distinction between the strata finally collapses can only be asserted 
by suppressing two aspects that are integral to Saussure’s understanding of  
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language, namely, the dimension of  time and the irreducible communality 
of  language. In fact, it is a re-examination of  these aspects that opens 
the possibility of  responding to the charge of  ‘inconsistency’ against 
Saussure’s conceptualization of  the sign.
In the particular langue that is instantiated in what Saussure refers to as 
the individual speaker’s ‘mind’ by the speaker’s particular utterance or parole, 
it may indeed be the case that the orders of  signifiers and signifieds are 
isomorphic. This is simply because the thought of  a sign is nothing other 
than that of  a concept materialized in sound. In beginning to elaborate the 
counterclaim that this isomorphy—and the consequent collapse of  the 
division between the two orders—is not, however, the end of  the story, two 
points are worth noting. Firstly, when a concept is said to attain a coupling 
with an acoustic image, the concept in question is neither an eternally 
existing nor a ‘naturally available’ concept—concepts implicated in signs 
have to do neither with ideas that are individuated at the heights of  the 
Platonic heaven nor differentiated substances present on the Aristotelian 
earth. Not unlike the real that Lacan describes as the ‘noise in which one 
can hear anything and everything’,7 concepts considered independently 
of  their constitutive relation to signs can only be posited as a ‘shapeless 
and indistinct mass’ of  thought.8 The possibility of  meaning, dependent 
on the differential order of  signifieds, does not precede the institution 
of  a system of  differences, which in Lacanian theory is conceptualized 
as the intervention of  the symbolic, and in Saussurean linguistics, as 
langue. Secondly, langue, while designating that system of  difference in its 
synchronicity, is nonetheless said to be ‘ever on the move, pressed forward 
by its imposing machinery of  negative categorization’.9 The second point 
is crucial for this paper: a response to Laclau’s claim that the duality of  
the sign collapses in Saussure’s conception of  the coupling of  a signifier 
with a signified shall be developed through the examination of  how 
the ‘movement’ of  langues is conceived in the Saussurean text, without 
attributing to the ‘shapeless and indistinct mass’ of  thought a capacity for 
self-movement or self-differentiation. 
Kojin Karatani’s reading of  Saussure’s linguistic theory in Transcritique 
provides a valuable point of  departure for the abovementioned 
examination. Saussure’s ‘conviction’, Karatani writes, ‘was that in language 
there are only differences; it is a system of  pure value’.10 Karatani contends 
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that ‘these statements could not have been said had he thought within a 
unitary system (i.e., of  a langue)’, for Saussure 
introduced the concept of  value only when he took into consideration 
another system of  Langue: Saussure’s point is that when a word is 
translated into another language, it achieves the same meaning, yet at 
the same time, the value of  the world is altered in the new/different 
system in correspondence to its different relationship with other words. 
From this focal point, he explains that there is no meaning (the signified) 
that is apodictically tied to the signifier, in other words, no immanent 
meaning.11
The implication, firstly, is that instaurations and disappearances of  
terms in a langue—that is, changes within a language system—can happen 
as a result of  its interaction with other langues that differ from it. But more 
importantly, that Saussure found it necessary to introduce the concept 
of  value as distinct from meaning (signified) when ‘manifold/different 
systems are at stake’ opens the possibility of  a reading that reverses the one 
followed by Laclau by making the plurality of  systems (langues) into an 
irreducible, constitutive dimension of  the Saussurean concept of  language. 
This alternative reading—which chooses to regard as an innovation that 
which Jakobson saw as a symptom of  Saussure’s confusion, namely, the 
concept of  value—allows that the isomorphism between the order of  the 
signifiers and the order of  the signifieds to be asserted as Laclau does, but 
only when language is considered solely in its synchronic and solipsistic 
dimension, as ‘one synchronic system’. However, in as much as the plurality 
of  langues is constitutive of  language in the Saussurean conception as the 
alternative reading proposes, the isomorphism of  the signifier and the 
signified—and the alleged collapse of  the distinction between the two 
orders—can be placed under question. 
The reversal on which the alternative reading is based is enabled by 
the fact that the Saussurean proposition that language is social means 
neither simply that language is ‘a fait social (Durkheim) beyond individual 
consciousness’ nor that ‘individual terms exist only in a larger relational 
system’.12 Rather, as Karatani rightly asserts, Saussure’s claim is that ‘language 
is properly social only when it is seen as, and in, communication with the 
other—with those others who belong to other systems of  rules (langues) 
or communities’.13 The first step toward understanding this claim involves 
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tying together the sociality of  language and the shift in the relationship 
between the terms of  a langue—the idea that ‘if  a given term were to drop 
out of  the system […] its contents would go to its competitors’14—as a 
consequence of  the former. Suppose that a person enters conversation 
with a botanist whose langue contains more terms than that person in the 
field of  botany. It is supposable that ‘mass’ of  thought—that is, the stratum 
of  concepts or signifieds—concerning plants is intricately differentiated 
for the botanist who commands a great number of  terms apropos botany, 
whereas the botanist’s interlocutor, possessing only a handful of  terms 
to speak about plants, has a relatively less differentiated set of  concepts 
pertaining to plants. If  the botanist were to introduce a new term to the 
interlocutor’s vocabulary that pertains to plants, the latter’s conceptual 
mass would ‘cut up’ into more pieces, into finer-grained distinctions, 
resulting in a greater number of  differential relations—though it will likely 
remain the case the way that the interlocutor’s concepts is differentiated 
will not match the botanist’s, as long as the botanist continues to possess 
more terms, hence finer conceptual distinctions, than the interlocutor. 
The preceding example begins to sketch the process that Saussure calls 
the ‘negative action of  signs’.15 For Saussure, a new sign is never a ‘direct’ 
introduction of  a new positive idea, but the introduction of  a new sign 
does effect a reconfiguration or repartition of  the mass of  thought, or 
concepts, that is the order of  the signifieds. Hence, the ‘number of  positive 
ideas which a sign must cover at a given moment is therefore never limited. 
Its limit may only be negative, drawing on the simultaneous presence of  
other signs. It is thus pointless to seek the totality of  a word’s meanings’.16 
The ‘permanent condition of  language [les conditions permanentes de la langue]’ 
is such that ‘if  you add a sign to the language system, you proportionally 
diminish the meaning of  the other signs [si vous augmentez d’un signe la langue 
vous diminuez d’autant la signification des autres]. Conversely: if, per impossibile, 
only two signs had been chosen in the beginning, all meanings [toutes les 
significations] would have been distributed [réparties] among these two signs. 
One would have designated [désigné] half  the objects, and the other the 
other half ’.17 The stage on which ‘change, varying degrees of  shifts in 
the relationship between the signified and the signifier’ often takes place 
is where interactions between heterogeneous langues occur, namely, the 
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community of  language users.18 Neologisms, for example, begin their lives 
within small coteries of  users, and then gradually gain wider usage. At 
the beginning, the small group of  speakers for whom the neologism was 
present in their langue would have been attuned to a langue that is different 
from the langue shared by the rest of  their linguistic community. Only later 
may the new sign enter wider circulation and reconfigure a wider range of  
langues in the community. 
The analysis of  the sign as divided between the orders of  the signifier 
and the signified enables structural linguistics to account for the kind of  
transformation described above in the langue of  an individual, in which one 
and the same signifier, from an initially more ‘extensive’ distribution of  a 
conceptual mass (that is, the ‘number of  positive ideas’ that a sign covers), 
becomes coupled with the less extensive distribution of  the conceptual 
mass (the converse of  which also may happen), without recourse to a 
naturalistic referential theory of  meaning. The langue that is instantiated 
by an individual’s act of  speech is synchronically analysable in terms of  
the dual strata of  differences that are, as Laclau had claimed, isomorphic, 
to the extent that in a sign, a signifier is coupled with a particular part of  
a conceptual mass, one signified. But if  there are heterogeneous langues in 
interaction, as it was the case for the botanist and the interlocutor in the 
example earlier, and if  this interaction really is a ‘permanent condition 
of  language’ as asserted by Saussure, then it follows that the Saussurean 
account is one in which the relation between signifiers and signifieds is 
permanently and inescapably exposed to the possibility of  shifts due to 
the heterogeneous langues of  different groups of  speakers with which 
a speaker comes into contact. Interacting with another langue is able to 
produce altered relations between signifiers and signifieds of  the langue of  
a speaker, so that one and the same acoustic image, although still coupled 
to some particular part of  the speaker’s conceptual mass, nevertheless 
will have coupled with a part that—due to its differing extensiveness and 
positionality—can no longer be considered the same as the part prior to 
that interaction. Systematization of  a langue into a particular synchronic 
formation is conceivable precisely as achieved in the instance of  an 
interaction (with another speaker), which must necessarily instantiate 
a particular langue as a systematic totality. But that such instantiation 
in interaction is the origin of  any particular langue implies that the 
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synchronicity of  a langue is exposed to the diachronic dimension by which 
the effects of  encounters with other langues will have inscribed themselves 
in that langue, possibly as new signifiers and reconfigurations of  concepts. 
It would not be far-fetched, at this point, to suggest that the possibility of  
what Laclau conceptualizes as ‘dislocation’ is not alien to the Saussurean 
sign—a possibility that will become clearer once the irreducibly social 
existence of  language is considered in more detail.
The Irreducibly Social Being of  Language
In the example of  the botanist and her interlocutor, an overlap 
between the langue of  the botanist and the interlocutor’s langue is implied 
by their ability to meaningfully interact and produce sounds that are not 
perceived as mere noise to each other. But the example also evinces that 
the overlap certainly need not be total for their conversation to be possible. 
Extrapolating from this, a proliferation of  heterogeneous langues in a 
community that purports to speak one and the same language can easily 
be entertained. Saussure writes that there is ‘no precise point marks the 
beginning of  one language and the end of  another’.19 The limit of  even 
just one language is never identifiable with the set of  any number of  langues 
that are believed to compose it—even if  that non-identity is due merely 
to the supernumerary attachment of  the proper name of  the language 
(‘English’, ‘German’, etc.) to a given set of  langues, sometimes motivated 
by, as Saussure suspects happened with Italian, apparently extra-linguistic 
influences such as ‘national will’.20 The non-identity between any set of  
langues and any purported totality of  a language applies conversely as well: 
no one langue has a legitimate claim to being the privileged and complete 
embodiment of  a language. Neither actual nor ideal unity of  a language 
needs to be posited in the Saussurean conception. But if  it is neither actual 
nor ideal unity, what is the being of  (one or another) language? The response 
that is consistent with what has hitherto been argued is clear: language is 
irreducibly social, from which it follows that a language always comprises a 
plurality of  heterogeneous langues. No one langue can serve as the exclusive 
representative of  a language. To hope to elevate one langue as the full 
embodiment of  a language would be a dream comparable to the hope for 
a fully homogenous and self-identical community—the ideological fantasy 
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par excellence. Language, Saussure asserts, ‘is not complete in any speaker; 
it exists perfectly only within a collectivity’.21 This assertion is to be read 
with an emphasis on being: a language is ‘perfect’ when it is irreducibly 
social, that is, when it comprises a plurality of  heterogeneous langues.
If  speaking the same language does not imply sharing an identical 
langue, then it is possible to think of  the variances among langues of  
various groups of  individuals, variances that would obtain by virtue of  
the differences between the groups’ positions in the space of  the social. 
This thought, by suggesting that utterances may be conditioned by the 
speaker’s subject position, already marks a significant departure from 
seeing a speaker’s utterances as merely outcomes of  unpredictable and 
unregulated ‘whims’. Indeed, herein is one point of  intersection between 
the Laclauian theory of  discourse and Saussurean linguistics. The ‘basic 
proposition’ of  Hegemony and Socialist Strategy identified by Slavoj Žižek, 
namely, that ‘Society’—as a harmonious and totalizable whole—‘doesn’t 
exist’,22 is comparable to the Saussurean view that a linguistic community is 
not a community of  one and the same langue. If, for Laclau, the plurality of  
discourses and positions that compose the social prevents the social from 
constituting itself  as a harmonious and unified whole, then the Saussurean 
account recognizes that the ‘minds’ of  individuals on which a portion of  
language is imprinted should vary according to differences in the positions 
of  those individuals. In so far as there is no unified social totality, there is 
no unified totality of  speakers all of  whom instantiate the same langue in 
their speech. What needs to be made explicit is the political implications 
of  this outcome.
While considering the mechanism by which languages become 
fragmented and diversified, Saussure imagines a situation wherein people 
from other places pass through a village, and some from that villager 
travel to some other village, and so forth. Reflecting on such ‘interaction’, 
Saussure notes that ‘difference according to locality is both an illusion 
and a reality. It may or may not occur, but it is impossible to predict this 
for a given detail’.23 The occurrence and details of  a particular interaction 
cannot be determined in advance by linguistic theory. What can be offered, 
nevertheless, is a theoretical proposition on the ‘forces’ that operate within 
a language due to interactions between different groups of  people, that is, 
due to its social existence: ‘two principles are forever in opposition, one 
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an equalizing force, the other particularizing. Divisive influences/Unifying 
influences […] resisting cohesion’.24 Discernible in Saussure’s text is thus an 
insight that begins to approach Laclau’s theorization of  the dislocation 
of  discourses, that no hegemonic discourse, however stable it may be, 
achieves a complete fixity of  social meanings or of  relations between 
subject positions, because the condition of  possibility of  every discourse 
is the simultaneous presence of  contradictory relations of  ‘equivalence’ 
and ‘difference’ that renders, as a result, a discourse as a systematic totality 
whose elements are fixed an impossible object comparable to a ‘square 
circle’.25
Even though Saussure’s own text does not contain the theoretical 
elaboration needed to rigorously establish the irreducibility and 
ineliminability of  a plurality of  langues as ontological conditions, it is not 
difficult to recognize at this point the kernel of  Saussure’s reflections that 
no poststructuralist inheritor of  his thought, including Laclau, can deny: 
in so far as there is a plurality of  heterogeneous langues in reality, the latent 
potential for the reconfiguration of  langues through interaction is to be 
thought as practically ineliminable. A language that is entirely hegemonized 
by one langue is in reality impossible, for the irreducible sociality of  
language entails that the heterogeneity between langues that are instantiated 
by various groups of  speakers persists, exerting both particularizing and 
unifying influences on the community of  language speakers, preventing 
its final closure. If  political practice aims toward hegemony through the 
universalization of  a particular discourse or representation of  a particular 
social identity as universal, then, from a Saussurean perspective, political 
practice is to be seen as underlain by attempts to change the minds of  
individuals by inscribing a particular langue in a language community. 
In other words, if  the social is a space of  contention between different 
political discourses to attain a hegemonic status, then language can similarly 
be seen as a domain of  contention between various langues, some of  which 
are trying to impose its system of  differences onto the orders of  signifiers 
and signifieds instantiated by the linguistic acts of  as many speakers as 
possible, without, however, ever being able to eliminate the heterogeneity 
of  the community completely—whatever success actually achieved by 
attempts to hegemonize language will always be temporary. The remainder 
of  this paper shall further explore this confluence of  the hegemonic 
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reconfiguration of  the space of  the social and the reconfiguration langues 
of  a language community.
Difference, Opposition, Association
In a crucial passage, Saussure explains that, when brought into 
circulation as signs, differences in the strata of  signifiers and signifieds are 
converted to oppositions between a sign and other signs: 
When we compare signs—positive terms—with each other, we can 
no longer speak of  difference; the expression would not be fitting, for 
it applies only to the comparing of  two sound-images, e.g. father and 
mother, or two ideas, e.g. the idea ‘father’ and the idea ‘mother’; two 
signs, each having a signified and signifier, are not different but only 
distinct. Between them there is only opposition. The entire mechanism 
of  language, with which we shall be concerned later, is based on 
oppositions of  this kind and on the phonic and conceptual differences 
that they imply.26 
It has become a structuralist platitude that ‘two things can […] be 
differentiated from one another only to the extent that they are opposed 
to the other’.27 As any two signs must be differentially positioned, it 
follows that there is a minimal and yet absolute non-identity between any 
two signs—this is a trivial point. But opposition does not follow trivially 
from difference. ‘Bourgeoisie’ is not ‘proletariat’, but the opposition 
between the two cannot be deduced from the mere fact that the former 
signifier is not identical to the latter. Instead, it is the retrospection of  
the historical events surrounding groups that have been designated thus 
that establishes the two terms as oppositional terms. The thinkability of  
opposition between signs, therefore, presupposes each sign as having 
attained a kind of  self-identity ascribable to it, that is, a particular relation 
between a signifier and a signified instead of  some other relation—a relation 
whose determination, as has been argued previously, is profoundly 
affected by the sociality of  language. Value, which Karatani had pointed 
out was introduced by Saussure as a category distinct from the signified 
when considering the irreducible social dimension of  language, pertains 
precisely to this self-identity achievable in a sign, in as much as it is in 
circulation along with signs that may originate in autre langues. And this 
achievement of  self-identity is the only sense in which a sign can be said 
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to be a ‘positive term’ without betraying Saussure’s own ‘basic principles’ 
of  linguistics. 
The shift from the difference between signifiers and between signifieds 
to the opposition between signs is indicative of  the mechanism of  the 
actualization of  a particular utterance over others. Conceiving actual 
utterances necessitates the conceptual shift because differences in the 
orders of  the signifier and the signified do not yet account for the self-
identity achieved as the coupling an actual utterance instantiates between 
a particular signifier and a particular signified. That the mechanism is 
termed ‘opposition’ is not accidental, for the instance of  one sign in 
‘actualized parole’—an utterance—implies that a particular ‘potential parole’ 
has prevailed by repressing the actualization of  all other possibilities that 
had been available in the ‘group of  elements created and associated in 
the [speaker’s] mind’.28 The logic of  actualization that always implies the 
negation of  what Saussure calls ‘competitors’, that is, the other ‘potential 
elements’ that could have entered an utterance, operates between signs 
however conceptually and phonically proximal within the differential 
system of  that langue the signs may be to another. ‘A as opposed to B’ 
is thus the ‘entire mechanism’ by which language instantiates itself  
materially. In reality, there are ambiguities, polysemes, and an overall 
degree of  confusion to language, blurring, as it were, lines of  opposition 
between terms. That there are ambiguities and polysemes and inaccuracies 
in language is simply the facticity of  language and does not constitute 
an interesting observation. As Saussure writes, ‘[c]omplaining about the 
inaccuracy of  language’ merely ‘suggests ignorance of  the source of  
its power. It is quite impossible to prevent a single, specific thing being 
variously referred to as a house, a construction, a building, a structure’.29 
The interesting question, rather, is what makes it possible, in a particular 
context or situation, for a term (e.g. ‘building’) to be interchangeable 
with others (e.g. ‘construction’, ‘structure’, etc.). It is this question that is 
addressed by the notion of  association.
When presented with two terms whose signifieds are relatively co-
extensive (i.e. cover overlapping parts of  the conceptual mass), there is 
a reduction in the range of  available options when the speaker has to 
decide on one out of  many possible terms. Thus, in a certain situation, 
the terms could be more or less interchangeable—a phenomenon that 
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Saussure intended to grasp with the category of  value—for the speaker 
in question. For a human person can simultaneously belong to a plurality 
of  situations, although there is always opposition between signs, relative 
co-extensiveness of  the conceptual mass with which those are coupled 
is not unthinkable. The converse also holds: the terms that would be 
interchangeable in certain situations may not be in others. Although 
lines of  opposition between terms such as ‘structure’, ‘building’ and 
‘construction’ may be more blurred when there is interchangeability in a 
plurality of  situations, opposition becomes clearer in situations where the 
terms are not interchangeable. As terms that may be ‘picked out’ in an act 
of  utterance, these terms comprise potential parole. They are imprinted on 
the speaker’s mind, forming ‘associative families’ each composed of  terms 
that are somehow related:
Those that have something in common are associated in the memory, 
resulting in groups marked by diverse relations. For instance, the French 
word enseignement ‘teaching’ will unconsciously call to mind a host of  other 
words (enseigner ‘teach,’ renseigner ‘acquaint’, etc; or armament ‘armament’, 
changement ‘amendment’, etc. ; or education ‘education’, apprentissage 
‘apprenticeship’ etc.) All those words are related in some way.30
The absence of  detailed explanation as to why a certain term calls 
to mind a particular set of  other terms is a lacuna that readily invites 
the kind of  view held by Laclau, that the sentences of  the Saussurean 
subject is governed by its whims. On the one hand, it seems to be phonetic 
propinquity (enseignement, justement…) that influences the set of  other 
terms that is recalled, while on the other hand, it appears as if  conceptual 
overlap—‘analogy of  the concepts signified’, as Saussure puts it31—
determines the terms that belong to a same associative family (enseignement, 
instruction, apprentissage, éducation…). In the end, it must be said that the type 
of  relation that ultimately prevails in a given parole will, again, be dependent 
on the situation—the Freudian text abounds with case studies of  either. 
But in an interpersonal, social situation, it seems plausible to assume that 
a speaker’s considerations regarding the interchangeability of  terms in a 
given syntagm or sentence are likely to be reliant more on the conceptual 
rather than on the acoustic aspect of  signs. If  so, though it may not be the 
exhaustive picture, at least a partial explanation as to how an associative 
family forms has already been provided by the preceding exposition: terms 
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in an associative relation are recalled based on their conceptual proximity 
that pertains to the co-extensiveness of  the conceptual parts to which 
those terms are related. At this point, the key remaining task is to make 
explicit the proximity between the Laclauian theory of  hegemony and 
Saussurean linguistics that is implied by the results so far, thereby bringing 
to the foreground the political implications of  the latter.
The Confluence of  Saussurean Linguistics and Laclauian 
Hegemonic Politics
‘If  the abstract system of  formal rules governing the combination 
and substitution between elements is no longer necessarily attached to any 
particular substance’, Laclau writes, ‘any signifying system in society […] 
can be described in terms of  that system’.32 The strict formalism of  this 
approach implies that ‘substantial differences between the linguistic and 
the non-linguistic have also to be dropped’.33 The theoretical outcome of  
the abolition of  the substantial difference firstly within language, and then 
between the linguistic and the non-linguistic, is observed when Laclau and 
his collaborator Chantal Mouffe define ‘discursive structure’ not as a ‘merely 
“cognitive” or “contemplative” entity’, but as ‘an articulatory practice which 
constitutes and organizes social relations’.34 Since substantial differences 
between the linguistic and the non-linguistic are no more, articulation, too, 
is liberated from its ties to specifically linguistic utterances, and comes to 
designate ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements [i.e. entities 
that possess discursive positionalities] such that their identity is modified 
as a result of  the articulatory practice’.35 And because Laclau and Mouffe 
‘reject the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices’,36 
constitution as an object of  discourse through articulation is, for them, 
the process of  the constitution of  objectivity in general. In the general 
ontology of  Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, a work representative of  a phase 
of  Laclau’s thinking prior to the later influence of  the Lacanian theory of  
the subject, even the category of  subject comes to be understood primarily 
‘in the sense of  “subject positions” within a discursive structure’—that is, 
in terms of  discursively constituted objects.37 
The conceptualization of  the subject in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 
then, reflects an Althusserian conception of  the subject as ‘material 
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actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which 
are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which 
derive the ideas of  that subject’.38 What is termed ‘articulation’ by Laclau 
and Mouffe encompasses social rituals and practices in general, including 
specifically verbal articulations that are no longer categorially distinct from 
‘material actions’ in the Althusserian sense. Thus, while the substantial 
dichotomy between the strata of  the signifier and the signified is denied by 
Laclau, who asserts that, in his system, ‘there are only signifiers’,39 speaking 
of  ‘signifieds’ is acceptable for him in so far as they refer not to a stratum 
co-primordial with the stratum of  signifiers, but to the signification 
(meaning) of  subject positions represented by some signifiers that emerge 
as an effect of  material practices of  articulation. A subject position, it 
might be said, is always ‘coupled’ with some particular set of  articulatory 
practices that defines that position. This coupling, as is frequently said 
about the coupling of  a signifier and a signified in a linguistic sign, might 
be said to be ‘arbitrary’, but only in the limited sense that the relation—
that of  an identity—attained in the subject position between the signifier 
by which it is represented and the material practices of  those identified 
as such does not express any underlying necessity. Thus, the term that 
better captures the relation, and the term that in fact actually is central to 
Laclau’s theory, is ‘contingent’—a choice of  term meant to underscore 
that while no identity is achieved out of  necessity, whichever identity that 
is actually achieved is not an outcome of  pure chance either. But, as hinted 
by the preceding discussions of  the sociality of  language, whatever value 
attained by the linguistic sign, too, is contingent in exactly this sense. For 
that which effects the shift in value—shifts in the relation between the 
signifier and the signified—is not pure chance, but some particular series 
of  interactions featuring some particular set of  linguistic communities, 
pluralities of  interlocutors and of  langues. 
The expected end result of  processes of  shift between the signifiers 
and the articulatory practices with which they are coupled is some 
particular fixity of  the meaning of  subject positions—a fixity that, 
however, could always be dislocated and undone, hence depriving any 
result of  a genuine finality. ‘[A]s every subject position is a discursive 
position’, Laclau and Mouffe argue, ‘it partakes of  the open character of  
every discourse; consequently, the various positions cannot be totally fixed 
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in a closed system of  differences’.40 What they call ‘hegemony’ consists 
fundamentally in attempts to institute a particular fixture of  the meaning 
of  elements across various discourses by social actors (such as political 
movements) through the construction of  ‘chains of  equivalence’ between 
various subject positions—a construction that necessarily takes place, 
Laclau argues, around some central signifier representing the equivalential 
relation. In the construction of  a chain of  equivalence, what is attempted 
is a subversion of  differences between subject positions by emphasizing 
a certain sameness between them.41 A hegemonic political practice seeks 
to ‘establish a chain of  equivalence among the different democratic 
struggles so as to create an equivalent articulation’ between a plurality of  
disenfranchised groups and their political demands.42 
Although hegemony implies that the articulatory practices of  multiple 
subject positions are made alike by the establishment of  an equivalential 
relation between those positions, Laclau and Mouffe emphasize that the 
equivalence that sustains hegemonic politics is not simply a ‘class alliance’, 
in the sense of  a ‘“coincidence of  interests”’ among preconstituted 
agents’,43 for the identities of  those subject positions—and the set of  
articulatory practices that defines them—are transformed in the very 
process of  establishing the equivalential relation. Thus, the construction 
of  equivalence yields a novel intersection of  subject positions, a new 
identity that did not exist prior to the construction of  that equivalence. 
This is explained by Laclau and Mouffe with a direct comparison of  their 
idea of  equivalence to paradigmatic relations in structural linguistics:
The logic of  equivalence is a logic of  the simplification of  political 
space, while the logic of  difference is a logic of  its expansion and 
increasing complexity. Taking a comparative example from linguistics, 
we could say the logic of  difference tends to expand the syntagmatic 
pole of  language, the number of  positions that can enter into relation of  
combination and hence of  continuity with one another; while the logic 
of  equivalence expands the paradigmatic pole—that is, the elements 
that can be substituted for one another—thereby reducing the number 
of  positions which can possibly be combined.44
The term ‘paradigmatic’ is not used by Saussure himself, whose 
preferred vocabulary, as seen before, is ‘associative’. Whatever salient 
differences there are between the two terms shall be disregarded here—it 
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suffices to say that the process of  constructing an equivalential chain for 
Laclau is the expansion of  the paradigmatic dimension, and that expanding 
the paradigmatic dimension corresponds to expanding the associate family 
of  terms in Saussurean linguistics. With this, all the grounds needed to 
assert the following thesis on the confluence of  Saussurean linguistics and 
hegemonic politics have been laid down: articulating a chain of  equivalence 
in the social space implies a certain reconfiguration of  the multiplicity of  
langues instantiated therein.
The thesis shall be explained with the help of  a simple example, a 
sketch of  just one of  the many ways in which the articulatory practices 
of  different subject positions may come to be alike, as needs to happen 
in the creation of  equivalence between those subject positions according 
to Laclau’s discourse theory. An individual who has identified with a 
particular subject position, say, of  the ‘informal worker’, would construct 
with ease a sentence such as ‘I stand for the informal workers’. After a 
chain of  equivalence has been established, for instance, through a popular 
mobilization, between the positions represented by signifiers ‘informal 
worker’, ‘the ninety-nine percent’, and ‘the working class’, the same 
individual will have come to utter ‘I stand for the working class’ or ‘I 
represent the ninety-nine percent’ just as naturally as he could ‘I stand for 
the informal workers’. In this case, it may be supposed that the terms ‘the 
working class’, ‘the ninety-nine percent’, and ‘informal worker’ have come 
to be interchangeable for the individual through articulatory practices of  
a popular mobilization, and that one of  the three terms likely will call up 
into the mind of  that individual the other two. It has been argued that in 
order for terms to belong to the same associative group, the langue of  the 
speaker has to be such that there is a conceptual co-extensiveness between 
the parts of  the conceptual mass coupled with those terms. Now, achieving 
this co-extensiveness can be understood as precisely the operation in 
the domain of  language proper that corresponds to the construction of  
equivalence between subject positions in hegemonic politics. Constructing 
an equivalential chain between a plurality of  subject positions involves a 
reconfiguration of  the langues of  those individuals who identify with the 
subject positions in question, such that the terms which are the names 
of  those positions become constituents of  a common associative family. 
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This reconfiguration cannot be conceived separately from the concrete 
interactions that must have occurred between individuals occupying 
different positions. In effect, any political movement whose socially 
transformative objective presupposes the creation of  an expansive 
political front must interact with those who are attuned to a variety of  
heterogeneous langues, and attempt to reconfigure those langues so that 
the terms that signify a plurality of  subject positions will have become 
interchangeable in social and political situations. 
Conclusion
As discourses are for Laclau, a langue is permanently exposed to the 
possibility of  reconfiguration, in so far as the presence of  heterogeneous 
langues is maintained in a language community that, indeed, can only be said 
to exist ‘perfectly’ in its plurality and plasticity. Not only does this thesis 
drawn from the Saussurean text constitute the basis of  a counterargument 
against the charge of  ‘inconsistency’ in the Saussurean concept of  the sign, 
it also points to the social and political implications—and it would not be 
an exaggeration to say that these implications are democratic—of  Saussure’s 
theorization of  language that are often underestimated. Reflections on 
associative groups, social interaction, and the situational reconfigurability of  
an individual’s langue found in the Saussurean text compose the beginnings 
of  a systematic account that may be able to explain how the occupation 
of  a particular subject position or identification with a particular political 
movement could influence what is said and is sayable by that individual. 
What, then, remains to be said of  the unregulated, unpredictable ‘whims’ 
that Laclau regards as that from which utterances of  the ‘omnipotent’ 
Cartesian subject allegedly presupposed by Saussurean linguistics emanate?
Someone placed in an extremely restrictive situation, such as a political 
prisoner who has been imprisoned for many years, would be incapable of  
the kind of  articulation that is socially consequential in any immediately 
obvious way. The utterances and actions of  persons in such circumstances 
will likely be limited to mere repetitions of  what they have been permitted 
to speak and do. Under such a condition, an individual appears to 
have little prospect of  doing something with language that effects a 
reconfiguration of  langues, which, this paper has suggested, is implicated in 
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socially transformative articulations. But Saussure, at one point, remarks 
that the terms ‘in an associative family occur neither in fixed numbers 
nor in a definite order’, adding that ‘we are unable to predict the number 
of  words that the memory will suggest or the order in which they will 
appear’.45 A small window of  possibility is opened by the unpredictability 
of  what will be brought to mind of  the speaker. Even when a certain 
langue has become ingrained in the minds of  speakers, there is a chance, 
that by a fortuitous accident in thought—‘All Thought emits a Throw of  
the Dice [Toute pensée émet un Coup de Dés]’, as Mallarmé had written—it will 
occur to them that some words can be used differently. In so far, however, 
it is nothing but the fleeting, aleatory moment in thought on which the 
possibility of  a different use of  words depends, the parole by which that 
possibility is materially actualized is likely to bear the outward appearance 
of  an unconditioned ‘whimsical’ vocalization. Yet, if  for this reason some 
‘Cartesian omnipotence of  the subject’ were imputed to those who find 
themselves subjected to heteronomy to an extreme extent, that imputed 
‘omnipotence’ could refer to nothing else than the indomitable freedom 
in thought. And this idea of  the subject’s freedom, it might be suggested, 
is not altogether distant from what Jacques Lacan had proposed as the 
margin of  freedom that is retained by the subject of  the signifier despite its 
alienation in language,46 and the concomitant possibility of  the subject to 
act in defiance of  established meanings rather than ‘act out’ in accordance 
with the expectations of  the Other, precisely by using signifiers differently, 
in ways that may initially be perceived by others as nonsensical.47 What 
had been used as a derogative epithet, then, may well designate the kernel 
of  freedom that cannot be forfeited by those who believe that anyone is 
capable of  starting a revolt in thought, even under the most inhospitable 
of  material conditions. 
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